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During the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, USA (2014–2015), 
2 outbreaks of Legionnaires’ disease occurred in Genesee 
County, Michigan. We compared whole-genome sequences 
of 10 clinical Legionella pneumophila isolates submitted to a 
laboratory in Genesee County during the second outbreak 
with 103 water isolates collected the following year. We 
documented a genetically diverse range of L. pneumophila 
strains across clinical and water isolates. Isolates belong-
ing to 1 clade (3 clinical isolates, 3 water isolates from a 
Flint hospital, 1 water isolate from a Flint residence, and 
the reference Paris strain) had a high degree of similarity 
(2–1,062 single-nucleotide polymorphisms), all L. pneu-
mophila sequence type 1, serogroup 1. Serogroup 6 iso-
lates belonging to sequence type 2518 were widespread 
in Flint hospital water samples but bore no resemblance to 
available clinical isolates. L. pneumophila strains in Flint tap 
water after the outbreaks were diverse and similar to some 
disease-causing strains. 
Legionnaires’ disease is a severe form of pneumonia caused by inhalation of virulent species of aerosolized 
Legionella bacteria. In January 2016, the Michigan Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) and the 
Genesee County Health Department publicly announced 2 
Legionnaires’ disease outbreaks in Genesee County, Mich-
igan, USA (1,2). The first outbreak occurred from June 
2014 through March 2015 and the second from May 2015 
through October 2015; a total of 90 cases and 12 deaths 
were documented (1–3). From April 2014 through Octo-
ber 2015, the city of Flint, in Genesee County, switched 
its drinking water source from Detroit Water and Sewer 
Department (DWSD), which used corrosion control, to 
the corrosive Flint River, without implementing federally 
mandated corrosion control; this new water source led to 
elevated lead in tap water over a prolonged period, now 
called the Flint water crisis (4). This disruption in water 
quality likely also stimulated the growth of L. pneumoph-
ila, the species most frequently identified as the causative 
agent of Legionnaires’ disease (5,6), in Flint’s distribution 
and plumbing systems (7).
Our prior work associated the Legionnaires’ disease 
outbreaks with factors known to be conducive to Legionel-
la growth: elevated iron (a consequence of corroded iron 
water mains), reduced free chlorine disinfectant residu-
als, and elevated water temperatures (7,8). Later, Zahran 
and colleagues reported that the odds of Flint residents 
being referred for Legionnaires’ disease treatment while 
the Flint River was the source of tap water increased 6.3-
fold and confirmed our report of associations with low 
chlorine residuals (9), but the odds analysis, which was 
based on the use of referral date rather than symptom on-
set date, excluded many healthcare-associated cases (10). 
Furthermore, during the second outbreak, Legionella 
spp. and L. pneumophila genes were found to be higher 
in the tap water of large buildings in Flint than in other 
water systems in US areas not experiencing outbreaks 
(8). Conversely, levels of the mip gene, which is specific 
to L. pneumophila, were largely below detection in Flint 
single-family residences, at least during the later stages of 
the water crisis when they were measured (2015–2016) 
(8). Large buildings with extensive plumbing networks, 
such as hospitals, are generally more susceptible to Legio-
nella growth than are simpler plumbing systems charac-
teristic of single-family homes (11); however, residences 
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are also of interest for Legionella growth, given concerns 
about the high rate of sporadic Legionnaires’ disease (12) 
and potential for exposure in the home.
Our study objective was to use next-generation DNA 
sequencing to compare L. pneumophila isolated from 
Flint tap water after the second Legionnaires’ disease 
outbreak with tap water isolates from neighboring drink-
ing water systems outside of Flint that were never served 
by Flint River water and clinical strains received during 
the second outbreak at a regional reference laboratory in 
Genesee County. Within Flint, Legionella isolates were 
obtained from the tap water of a hospital, a large pub-
lic building, and single-family residences several months 
after the water source was switched back to DWSD. In 
addition to serogroup testing, we used whole-genome se-
quencing to compare isolates in terms of sequence type 
(ST), average nucleotide identity, and single-nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs).
Materials and Methods
Water Sample Collection and Legionella Isolation
After Flint resumed purchasing water with corrosion con-
trol from the original supplier, DWSD, water sampling 
campaigns were conducted 5 months (March 7–9, 2016), 
8 months (June 21–27, 2016), and 10 months (August 15–
16, 2016) later. Samples were collected from residences, 
small businesses, a large public building, and a hospital in 
Flint; as controls, samples were collected from buildings 
located outside of Flint that used DWSD or well water 
(Table 1). The March 2016 campaign targeted sampling 
of residences, small businesses, a large public building, 
and a hospital; samples were collected from hot (flushed 
for 30 seconds) and cold (stagnant) taps at each location. 
Samples were collected from the kitchen sink in homes 
and from restrooms in public buildings. The June 2016 
campaign extensively sampled homes as part of a water 
heater cleaning campaign; the following samples were 
collected before and after a cleaning protocol: hot and 
cold stagnant kitchen tap samples, a stagnant shower sam-
ple of blended hot and cold water, a hot flushed kitchen 
tap sample, the water heater drain valve, and a flushed 
cold water sample from the outside hose bib or nearest 
tap to the service entry point. The August 2016 campaign 
targeted sampling from hot (flushed 30 seconds) and cold 
(stagnant) water taps from homes and small businesses. 
Legionella was cultured according to standard methods 
(13), and colonies were streaked to isolation.
Clinical Isolates
MDHHS provided 11 clinical isolates from de-identified 
Legionnaires’ patients who received a diagnosis in 2015; 
however, 1 isolate could not be cultured and was deemed 
nonviable. When we initiated this study, we assumed that 
all 11 isolates originated from patients with some history 
of exposure in Flint or Genesee County during the Flint 
water crisis. However, we later learned that the common-
ality among clinical isolates was that they had been sub-
mitted to a Genesee County laboratory for analysis during 
the second outbreak and that 3 of the 11 isolates originated 
from patients who resided and received treatment outside 
of Genesee County (J. McFadden, MDHHS, pers. comm., 
2017 Feb 1). Because the clinical isolates in this study 
were de-identified, comparison with the water isolates is 
described in terms of “L. pneumophila known to be capable 
of causing LD.” We also included publicly available DNA 
sequence information from clinical reference strains in the 
analysis (Appendix 1 Table 2, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/25/11/18-1032-App1.pdf).
Whole-Genome Analysis of L. pneumophila Isolates
Whole-genome sequencing was conducted by MicrobesNG 
(https://microbesng.uk) on an Illumina MiSeq (https://www.
illumina.com) with 2 × 250-bp paired-end reads and Nextera 
library preparation (Illumina). Sequencing was performed 
for a representative subset of each building type and water 
source, including 103 water isolates and the 10 available clin-
ical L. pneumophila isolates (Appendix 1 Table 1). To verify 
DNA integrity, DNA extracts were quantified via a Qubit 2.0 
fluorometer (https://www.thermofisher.com) and analyzed 
via gel electrophoresis. Positive (L. pneumophila strain 130b) 
and negative (Stenotrophomonas maltophilia) control strains 
were also sequenced, and 3 clinical strains were sequenced 
in duplicate on 2 MiSeq runs to evaluate run-to-run variation 
(Appendix 1 Figures 1–3). On average, 806,825 reads were 
obtained per isolate (range 280,380–2,031,828 reads). Reads 
were trimmed by using Trimmomatic (14), and de novo as-
semblies were generated by using SPAdes (15).
Genome sequences are available in GenBank under 
BioProject PRJNA453403. Legionella species assignments 
were determined via blastn (https://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) 
for isolate 16S rRNA gene sequences. Average nucleotide 
identity was calculated as previously described (16), and 
SNPs were identified by using kSNP3.0 (17). We also in-
cluded 9 L. pneumophila reference strains (Appendix 1 Ta-
ble 2). We performed sequence-based typing targeting the 
flaA, pilE, asd, mip, mompS, proA, and neuA alleles (18) by 
using the mompS tool (19).
Serogroup Analysis
We identified L. pneumophila isolates belonging to sero-
group 1 via detection of the wzm gene (20) in whole genome 
sequences. We verified DNA sequence-based classifications 
and determined unknown serogroups by using direct fluores-
cent antibody staining with fluorescein isothiocyanate–con-
jugated antibodies (m-TECH, http://www.4m-tech.com).
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Results
Legionella Isolate Characterization
Of the 515 total water samples collected and from which L. 
pneumophila isolation was attempted (Table 1), 43 samples 
(8%) were positive for Legionella. Of these, 22 (58%) of 38 
hospital samples from March 2016, eight (2%) of 370 resi-
dence samples from June 2016 (positives originating from 
2 separate residences), and 6 (21%) of 28 residence sam-
ples from August 2016 (positives originating from different 
taps in a single residence) were positive for culturable L. 
pneumophila. No isolates were obtained from businesses 
receiving DWSD water, but 6 (86%) of 7 taps at the school 
serviced by well water were identified as positive (although 
5 of these were later determined to be Legionella species 
other than L. pneumophila).
16S rRNA genes mined from whole-genome sequenc-
es indicated that all clinical and water isolates, except for 
8 of the 9 well water isolates, were L. pneumophila. The 
positive control strain was correctly identified as L. pneu-
mophila; SNP analysis further classified it according to its 
known provenance (130b), and the negative control strain 
was also confirmed to be S. maltophilia (i.e., not Legio-
nella). Serogrouping via presence of the wzm gene for se-
rogroup 1 and direct fluorescent antibody staining for other 
serogroups indicated that all L. pneumophila isolates be-
longed to serogroups 1 and 6 (Table 2).
L. pneumophila isolates from clinical and water sam-
ples belonged to several STs (Table 2). Of serogroup 1 iso-
lates, all belonged to STs 1, 44, 159, 192, 211, 213, or 222 
or to a previously uncharacterized ST that we submitted 
to the European Working Group for Legionella Infections 
database (http://www.ewgli.org) and that has now been 
designated as ST2513. Serogroup 6 isolates all belonged 
to a previously uncharacterized ST that has now been 
designated as ST2518. Most hospital isolates belonged to 
ST2518, and isolates originating from residential tap water 
belonged primarily to ST192. Only ST1 was represented 
by both clinical and water isolates, specifically, 3 clinical 
isolates, 3 isolates from hospital tap water, and 1 isolate 
from residential tap water.
When classified according to SNP similarity, isolates 
formed distinct clades that were generally consistent with the 
ST classification (Figure). The ST1 clade varied by 2–1,062 
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Table 1. Total number of buildings sampled, number of samples collected, and number of isolates analyzed for Legionella, Flint, 
Michigan, USA* 
Water sample source 
March 2016 
 
June 2016 
 
August 2016 
No. 
buildings 
or samples 
No. (%) 
positive 
No. 
isolates 
analyzed 
No. 
buildings 
or samples 
No. (%) 
positive 
No. 
isolates 
analyzed 
No. 
buildings 
or samples 
No. (%) 
positive 
No. 
isolates 
analyzed 
Flint residences 5 0 
 
 32† 2 (6) 
 
 10‡ 2 (20) 
 
 Hot (flushed) 5 0 0  62 2 (3) 3  14 1 (7) 1 
 Hot (stagnant) NS    62 2 (3) 4  NS   
 Cold (flushed) NS    61 1 (2) 2  NS   
 Cold (stagnant) 5 0 0  61 1 (2) 4  11 4 (36) 1 
 Water heater  
 drain valve 
NS 
  
 62 1 (2) 5  NS 
  
 Shower (hot and  
 cold) 
NS    62 1 (2) 2  3 1 (33) 1 
Hospitals 1 1 (100) 
 
 NS 
  
 NS 
  
 Hot (flushed) 19 16 (84) 56  NS 
  
 NS 
  
 Cold (stagnant) 19 6 (32) 14  NS 
  
 NS 
  
Buildings receiving 
DWSD water 
4 0 
 
 NS 
  
 8 0 
 
 Hot (flushed) 4 0 0  NS 
  
 8 0 0 
 Cold (stagnant) 4 0 0  NS 
  
 8 0 0 
Flint large buildings 2 1 (50) 
 
 NS 
  
 NS 
  
 Hot (flushed) 5 0 0  NS 
  
 NS 
  
 Cold (stagnant) 5 1 (20) 1  NS 
  
 NS 
  
Buildings receiving 
well water 
1 1 (100) 
 
 NS 
  
 NS 
  
 Hot (flushed) 4 4 (100) 5§  NS 
  
 NS 
  
 Cold (stagnant) 3 2 (67) 4¶  NS 
  
 NS 
  
Flint small businesses 6 0 
 
 NS 
  
 8 0 
 
 Hot (flushed) 6 0 0  NS 
  
 8 0 0 
 Cold (stagnant) 6 0 0  NS 
  
 8 0 0 
*Positive samples indicate presumptive L. pneumophila identified by performing culture according to the method described in (12). Unless otherwise 
noted, identification as L. pneumophila was confirmed by using whole-genome sequencing. Boldface indicates total buildings sampled. Blank cells 
indicate that data were not reported when applicable samples were not collected. NS, no samples of this type were collected.  
†1 of the 32 homes was also sampled in March 2016. 
‡5 of the 10 homes were also sampled in March 2016; 1 of the 10 was sampled in June 2016 (but not in March 2016; samples from this house were 
positive on both dates). 
§4 of 5 isolates were a non–L. pneumophila species, according to whole-genome sequencing. 
¶4 of 4 isolates were a non–L. pneumophila species, according to whole-genome sequencing. 
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SNPs, and isolates varied from the reference Paris strain 
by 371–505 SNPs. In particular, clinical isolate C3 shared 
the highest degree of similarity with Flint tap water isolates 
(38–46 SNPs). Some degree of variation is expected to be 
associated with variability in sequencing accuracy because 
the 3 clinical isolates that were sequenced in duplicate on 
multiple MiSeq lanes differed from their replicate by 0–10 
SNPs. Several other distinct clades emerged in which water 
isolates were grouped primarily by building type. A large 
clade of ST2518 isolates included most samples from the 
hospital, 1 sample from well water, and 1 sample from a 
large public building. Another clade contained only isolates 
originating from Flint residence water samples belonging to 
ST192. The SNP results were confirmed by phylogenetic 
analysis and average nucleotide identity comparison (Ap-
pendix 1 Figures 1–3; Appendix 2, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/25/11/18-1032-App2.xlsx).
The STs of 8 isolates derived from well water could 
not be determined because L. pneumophila–specific alleles 
were absent, suggesting that the isolates were mistakenly 
phenotypically characterized as L. pneumophila on the 
basis of colony morphology. Average nucleotide identity 
values comparing these isolates with the positive control 
L. pneumophila strain (130b) were 62.645%–62.969%, 
whereas average nucleotide identity values of a single spe-
cies are generally >95% (21). These 8 isolates seem to be 
most closely related to L. taurinensis, L. rubrilucens, or L. 
erythra, because the 16S rRNA genes extracted from these 
genomes shared >99% nt similarity to all 3 species.
Discussion
When considered per capita, the Legionnaires’ outbreaks 
in Genesee County are among the largest in US history. 
However, to our knowledge, few clinical sputum isolates 
were collected or preserved from these outbreaks; for most 
cases, only urine-antigen testing was conducted. A com-
mon problem in the United States is reliance on urine-an-
tigen testing and lack of collection of clinical Legionella 
isolates; these practices unfortunately limit the ability to 
track sources of infection, learn from past outbreaks, and 
prevent future outbreaks (22,23). Among the clinical spu-
tum isolates that were sent to Genesee County laboratories 
during the outbreaks, none were from patients residing in 
homes serviced by Flint water (S. Lyon-Callo, MDHHS, 
pers. comm., 2018 Apr 5); thus, direct examination of po-
tential residential exposure is not possible from this study. 
Given that 68% of patients’ residences were confirmed to 
not have been serviced by Flint water (3), the potential ex-
ists that a portion of the remaining 32% had some residen-
tial exposure in Flint.
Another challenge of tracking sources of Legionnaires’ 
disease is limited availability of water isolates. Given that 
the outbreaks were not publicly announced until 3 months 
after the conclusion of the second outbreak (January 2016), 
few environmental specimens were collected or preserved 
when the outbreaks were occurring. Analysis of any other 
water isolates that might exist from the time of the crisis 
would be valuable for learning more about this outbreak. 
MDHHS reported that 106 environmental Legionella spec-
imens were retained at a Flint hospital but were not submit-
ted to the State Health Department as had been requested 
(Sarah Lyon-Callo, MDHHS, pers. comm., 2019 Apr 30). 
Thus, a more definitive study of environmental sources of 
the outbreaks is not possible without a wider collection of 
clinical and environmental isolates.
Our study provides a survey of the landscape of ge-
netic diversity among Legionella isolates collected from 
tap water from a range of building types served by the 
Flint drinking water distribution system over the 1-year 
period after the switch back to DWSD water. We com-
pared these isolates with clinical isolates and with isolates 
from tap water of neighboring water systems never served 
by the Flint River or DWSD. Although it was not pos-
sible to collect water isolates during the actual outbreaks, 
previous studies have demonstrated that a single strain of 
2016 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 25, No. 11, November 2019
 
Table 2. Summary of Legionalla pneumophila isolates from Flint, 
Michigan, USA, 2016 
ST Serogroup Isolate origin* 
1 1 3 hospital water (HH17, HH25, HH56), 1 
residence water (RH08), 3 clinical (C2, 
C3, C7) 
44 1 1 clinical (C6) 
159 1 1 clinical (C1) 
192 1 19 residence water (RC01, RC02, RC03, 
RC04, RC06, RC07, RD01, RD02, RD03, 
RD04, RD05, RH02, RH03, RH04, RH05, 
RH07 RH07, RS01, RS02) 
211 1 1 clinical (C8) 
213 1 2 clinical (C4, C5) 
222 1 1 clinical (C9) 
2513† 1 1 clinical (C10) 
2518† 6 66 hospital water (HC01, HC02, HC03, 
HC04, HC05, HC06, HC07, HC08, HC09, 
HC10, HC11, HC12, HC13, HC14, HH01, 
HH02, HH03, HH04, HH05, HH06, HH07, 
HH08, HH09, HH10, HH11, HH12, HH13, 
HH14, HH15, HH16, HH18, HH19, HH20, 
HH21, HH22, HH23, HH24, HH26, HH27, 
HH29, HH30, HH31, HH32, HH33, HH34, 
HH35, HH36, HH37, HH38, HH39, HH40, 
HH41, HH42, HH43, HH44, HH45, HH46, 
HH47, HH48, HH49, HH50, HH51, HH52, 
HH53, HH54, HH55), 1 public building 
(PC01), 1 well water (WH03) 
ND ND HH28, RC05, RH01, RS03, WC01, WC02, 
WC03, WC04, WH01, WH02, WH04, 
WH05 
*First letter of isolate name indicates building type/location: H, hospital; R, 
residence; W, school using well water; P, large public building. Second 
letter indicates sample collection location; H, hot water tap; C, cold water 
tap; D, water heater drain valve; S, shower. Numerals 1–10 indicate 
clinical strains. ND, not determined because of lack of L. pneumophila–
specific alleles or insufficient genome coverage; ST, sequence type. 
†New sequence types from this study submitted to European Working 
Group for Legionella Infections database (http://www.ewgli.org). 
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L. pneumophila can colonize buildings and persist over 
multiple years (24–26). Thus, it is reasonable to assume 
that water isolates collected in 2016 were probably repre-
sentative of strains colonizing building water systems over 
the previous months or even years.
Our study provides reasonable evidence that plumbing 
served by the Flint drinking water system was colonized by 
strains of L. pneumophila capable of causing Legionnaires’ 
disease, particularly serogroup 1 and ST1. Although no 
epidemiologic links have been made between clinical cases 
and cooling tower exposures in these outbreaks, direct or 
indirect use of tap water (e.g., via feed to cooling towers) is 
possible. High degrees of similarity (2–1,062 SNPs) were 
noted between the ST1 isolates of clinical and water origin, 
a finding that was consistent with phylogenetic and average 
nucleotide identity analysis (Appendix 1 Figures 1–3; Ap-
pendix 2). The highest degree of similarity between clinical 
and water isolates was between C3 and RH08 (38 SNPs), 
HH25 (40 SNPs), HH17 (45 SNPs), and HH56 (46 SNPs). 
C2 differed from water isolates by 1,053–1,062 SNPs, and 
C7 differed from water isolates by 1,041–1,049 SNPs. 
With the exception of 1 isolate (WH03), isolates obtained 
from tap water from buildings never served by the Flint 
River were markedly distinct from those originating from 
residences or hospitals in Flint as well as the clinical iso-
lates. The low number of SNPs between replicate genomes 
sequenced in this study (0–10) suggests that the extent to 
which technical variation in whole-genome sequencing 
contributed to observed sequence variation is low. Previous 
studies have documented that although some Legionnaires’ 
disease outbreaks are characterized by L. pneumophila 
clinical strains that differ by as few as <5 SNPs, other out-
breaks may differ by as many as 418 core SNPs (27). Thus, 
the SNP variability between water and clinical strains of 
ST1 in this study, particularly C3, is comparable to the doc-
umented range of variation in other outbreaks. In contrast, 
clinical strain C2 varied from the Paris reference strain by 
only 505, C3 by 371, and C7 by 491 SNPs. Therefore, as-
certaining what level of SNP divergence between strains 
is demonstrative of a common source or virulent strain is 
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 25, No. 11, November 2019 2017
Figure. Single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analysis of isolates from study of Legionella pneumophila in tap water, Flint, 
Michigan, USA. Analysis was conducted in kSNP3.0 (https://sourceforge.net/projects/ksnp/) and visualized by using FigTree 14.3 
(https://github.com/rambaut/figtree/releases/tag/v1.4.3). Isolate sources: yellow, clinical samples; blue, hospital water; red, residence 
water; purple, public building water; green, buildings supplied by well water. With the exception of buildings supplied by well water, all 
buildings were serviced by Flint municipal water. Reference strains are detailed in Appendix 1 Table 2 (https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/25/11/18-1032-App1.pdf). Scale bar indicates nucleotide substitutions per site.
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challenging. Given the well-established pathogenicity of 
the Paris strain, the results are also suggestive of genomic 
similarity among virulent strains of Legionella. Regardless, 
the similarity between C3 and strains isolated from Flint 
tap water samples (38–46 SNPs) is notable.
ST1 water isolates were collected from taps of a hos-
pital and a residence, indicating that this ST seems to have 
been somewhat widespread in the water distribution system, 
spanning multiple Flint buildings. However, the presence 
of several distinct phylogenetic clades of L. pneumophila 
isolated from Flint water systems further demonstrates that 
a single strain of L. pneumophila did not dominate the sys-
tem citywide. We hypothesize that this finding is likely the 
result of conditions favorable to Legionella growth, which 
we previously documented in the Flint system (7), facilitat-
ing the proliferation of multiple strains of L. pneumophila 
in different buildings and parts of the system. Similarly, the 
broad distribution of clinical isolates across 7 STs supports 
the hypothesis that any waterborne exposures that resulted 
in Legionnaires’ disease could hypothetically have origi-
nated from a diverse array of L. pneumophila strains and 
exposure sources.
All clinical isolates characterized in this study be-
longed to L. pneumophila serogroup 1, which is identified 
as the cause of >57% of reported Legionnaires’ cases in the 
United States (6). ST1 (belonging to serogroup 1) has been 
widely implicated in Legionnaires’ outbreaks worldwide, 
including outbreaks in France (28), China (29), Germany 
(30), Canada (31), and the United States (32). In the United 
States, ST1 is thought to be both the most common cause 
of sporadic Legionnaires’ disease cases and the most com-
mon waterborne ST found in potable and nonpotable water 
(32). ST1 isolates are highly conserved at the nucleotide 
level (33), making it challenging to link clinical cases with 
environmental sources because of the prevalence of ST1 
and lack of genetic variability.
Water isolates belonging to serogroup 6, all classified 
as ST2518, were widespread in samples collected from a 
Flint hospital in March 2016. A study of L. pneumophila 
isolates collected from Flint tap water in September and 
October 2016 also found that serogroup 6 isolates were 
widespread in residential premise plumbing water samples, 
although these isolates all belonged to STs 367 and 461 
(34). Byrne and colleagues found that serogroup 6 strains 
were at least as infectious for macrophages as a known 
virulent laboratory strain, emphasizing the potential for Le-
gionnaires’ disease to be caused by strains other than sero-
group 1 (34), although more research is needed to confirm 
the relevance of serogroup 6 strains for human infectivity. 
In our study, none of the clinical strains available for analy-
sis were serogroup 6.
It is noteworthy that 19% of hot water and 12% of cold 
water taps were positive for culturable L. pneumophila. 
Although L. pneumophila typically multiplies at 25°C–
37°C (35) and prospers in hot water plumbing systems (36), 
it has also been widely documented in cold water taps; one 
molecular analysis–based study found that as many as 47% 
of surveyed cold water taps were positive for genes specific 
to L. pneumophila serogroup 1 (37).
When MDHHS recently conducted an epidemiologic 
characterization of the Genesee County Legionnaires’ dis-
ease cases recorded in 2014 and 2015, although a lack of 
clinical isolates hampered a comprehensive investigation, 
they found that exposures that occurred at 1 Flint hospital 
potentially explained most cases (1–3). Our study provides 
complementary whole-genome sequencing–based charac-
terization of clinical isolates and tap water L. pneumophila 
isolates collected after the Flint outbreaks. Notably, we 
found a high degree of similarity between 4 water isolates 
originating from Flint tap water and 3 regional clinical 
strains known to cause Legionnaires’ disease. Our study 
also established that a variety of L. pneumophila strains 
were culturable from Flint tap water and that they tended 
to cluster genetically by residence versus hospital origin. 
Likewise, we found notable diversity among clinical strains, 
spanning 7 STs. Thus, multiple L. pneumophila strains 
were associated with the Flint 2014–2015 Legionnaires’ 
outbreaks, potentially resulting from multiple sources of 
exposure, although further epidemiologic investigation is 
needed to identify whether multiple sources were involved 
and whether there were any common sources of exposure. 
Although we did not intend for this study to provide an epi-
demiologic analysis of precise sources of Legionella expo-
sure for Legionnaires’ patients, our publicly available data 
could support such studies in the future.
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Having standard biological reference ma-
terials, such as antigens and antibodies, is 
crucial for developing comparable research 
across international institutions. However, 
the process of developing a standard can 
be long and difficult. 
In this EID podcast, Dr. Tommy Rampling, 
a clinician and academic fellow at the Hos-
pital for Tropical Diseases and University 
College in London, explains the intricacies 
behind the development and distribution 
of biological reference materials. 
